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Abstract 
This paper provides a model to account for the empirical evidence that volatility reduces 
growth. In the model, greater volatility increases the cost associated with capital market 
imperfections and induces the financial intermediaries to charge higher interest rates. The 
model is based on one of overlapping generations with two types of technologies. The 
more productive technology requires fixed investment in the first period. Individual with 
income less than the amount of fixed investment may borrow in financial markets to 
obtain more productive technology. Increase in volatility raises the cost of borrowing and 
makes it less attractive to invest in more productive technology for individuals below 
certain income in the first period. Hence, volatility reduces growth by deterring people 
from taking advantage of more productive technology.   This model also explains the 
empirical findings of Ramey and Ramey (1995) that investment is not the channel 
between volatility and growth by suggesting that totals factor productivity rather than the 
total factor accumulation is the key for growth.  
 
Keywords: Volatility, Growth, Financial Development, Capital Market Imperfections, Costly State 
Verification, Limited Enforceability of Contracts.   
JEL Classifications: E220, G200, G330, O110, O400 
 
Ahmet Faruk Aysan 
Boğaziçi University 
Dept. of Economics 
34342 Bebek, Istanbul, Turkey 
Phone: 90-212-359 76 39 
Fax: 90-212-287 24 53 
ahmet.aysan@boun.edu 
 1
The Effects of Volatility on Growth and Financial Development through Capital 
Market Imperfections 
 
 
1-Introduction 
Distinctions between concepts of growth and development appear to be more 
relevant for many developing countries, considering their unstable growth experiences. 
Developing countries generally experience long period of economic booms followed by 
severe crises and recessions. Therefore, high growth performances experienced by many 
developing countries may not bring high level of development by taking proceeding slow 
down of their economies into account. High and positive growth rates must be stable for 
development. (Betancourt 1996). From this perspective, development rather than the 
growth is the primary objective by being a statement about the sustained growth. 
Unstable growth experiences of many developing countries become more relevant 
if the volatility of growth effects the long-term development. The recent studies provide 
evidence in this direction by indicating a negative relationship between volatility and 
growth [like Ramey and Ramey (1995) Aizenman and Marion (1997) Mobarak (2005)]. 
In this paper, we analyze the volatility and growth relationship by exploring the role of 
volatility on the losses associated with capital market imperfections. The motivation of 
the paper is based on an observation that countries with high growth volatility are also 
characterized with lack of well-developed financial markets and high degree of capital 
market imperfections. In this paper, we provide a model to explain this observation. The 
model shows that higher volatility first aggravates cost of capital market imperfections 
and then the increase in realized financial market imperfections prevents some people 
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from benefiting the more productive technology. In other words, volatility reduces 
growth by adversely effecting financial markets. 
Attempts to unravel the relationship between volatility and growth require to ask 
what is the mechanism linking the volatility to growth. The current literature mainly 
emphasizes the investment as a channel from volatility to growth. In this paper, however, 
we point out the productivity of investment rather than the level of investment as a 
primary reason for the adverse effect of volatility on growth. Our model suggests that 
volatility reduces the total productivity of an economy by aggravating the financial 
market imperfections and preventing the people from obtaining more productive 
technologies. 
Earlier research on volatility and growth focuses more on the relationship 
between volatility and investment due to the idea that increase in investment leads to 
higher growth. Theoretical literature provides explanations for both positive and negative 
relationship between volatility and investment. The positive link suggests that higher 
volatility increases the saving rate and thereby promotes the level of investment due to 
the precautionary motive. Another argument related with precautionary motive is that 
higher uncertainty associated with higher volatility induces people to acquire more 
human capital to hedge against future income uncertainty [Canton (2002)]. 
There seems to be more reasons to believe that volatility and investment could be 
negatively related.  Irreversibilities in investment support the negative relationship 
between volatility and investment [Bernanke (1989), Pindyck and Solimano (1994), 
Ranciere et al. (2003) and Aizenman and Marion (1993)]. These models imply that 
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volatility can reduce capital investment when adjustment costs are asymmetric and hence 
the investments are irreversible. 
Empirical evidence on volatility and growth is also mixed.  Kormendi and 
Meguire (1985) and Grier and Tullock (1989) find positive relationship between 
volatility of output growth and the mean growth rate using cross country comparison. 
Empirical evidence on negative relationship between volatility and growth seems to be 
more substantiated. Ramey and Ramey (1995) demonstrate a negative link between 
volatility and growth by using a panel of 92 countries as well as a subset of OECD 
countries. The findings of Aizenman and Marion (1993), (1997) and Mobarak (2005) also 
confirm the negative relationship between volatility and development. 
One surprising finding of Ramey and Ramey (1995) is that volatility lowers 
growth but is not significantly related to investment. Then, one may ask if investment is 
not the factor linking volatility to growth, what else accounts for the strong empirical 
evidence on the negative relationship between volatility and growth? The most likely 
answer is the factor productivity. Volatility hinders growth not only by reducing the level 
of investment but by adversely affecting the productivity of production. The significance 
of total factor productivity in growth is documented by Easterly and Levine (2001). They 
show that factor accumulation like investment on capital accumulation does not account 
for the cross-country differences in growth rates and they conclude that total factor 
productivity accounts for a substantial amount of cross-country growth differences. In 
this respect, our model provides a better explanation for the effects of volatility on the 
total factor productivity. In our model there are two types of technologies and volatility 
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prevents the people from obtaining more productive technology by aggravating the 
capital market imperfections. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is specified and 
explained in details. Hence, section 2 first exposes the definition of volatility employed in 
this paper and then it elucidates the basic propositions in the adverse effects of volatility 
on financial development. In section 3, the effects of volatility on financial development 
are linked to growth. Lastly, section 4 concludes. All the proofs are delegated to the 
appendix.  
 
2-The Model 
2-1-Production Technologies and Preferences: 
A small open economy has two production technologies to produce one good. 
More advanced technology uses fixed (human)1 capital and an inferior technology uses 
unskilled labor. Production with advanced technology is denoted by: 
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where StY is output at time t and A is the productivity factor and I is fixed investment on 
human capital needed to use this technology. To introduce the volatility into the model 
two types of productivity shocks are introduced. iε  is idiosyncratic productivity shock 
affecting individual i and independently and identically distributed across all individuals 
                                                 
1 Throughout the model, the fixed capital and human capital are used interchangeably. The fixed capital 
investment is required in the model. Whether it is human capital or any other types of capital is not crucial 
for the implications of the model. 
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with cumulative density function  )( iF ε  between εεε ~~ ≤≤− i . Aggregate 
macroeconomic shock is represented by δ  which is assumed to take only two values. 
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Therefore, aggregate volatility δ  has zero mean. Negative realization of δ  then 
characterizes a “recession” and positive realizations represent a “boom”. For the sake of 
simplicity fixed investment on human capital gives constant return to scale without an 
adjustment cost. Inferior technology is described by: 
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where NtY and 
n
tL  are output and unskilled labor input respectively. B  represents the 
volatile productivity parameter and nBw   is the marginal productivity of unskilled labor 
in this sector. 
The model is based on a two-period overlapping generations. The young decide 
whether to invest in human capital so that they can obtain the advanced technology and 
more output in the second period when they are old. Otherwise, individuals work in 
unskilled technology in both periods. Investment on human capital is fixed, indivisible 
represented by I. Each individual has one unit of labor in each period. Each individual 
has a parent when they are young and a child when they are old such that the population 
growth is zero. Individuals are altruistic and leave bequests to their children. To simplify 
the consumption and saving decision, it is assumed that all the consumption takes place 
in the second period of life. Hence, utility of an individual is denoted as: 
bcU log)1(log αα −+=  (3) 
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where c  is consumption in the second period and b   denotes the bequest and 10 ≺≺α . 
Since all individuals have one unit of labor, income distribution in the first period is 
determined by the distribution of bequests. 
 
2-2-Financial Markets: 
Individuals have access to capital markets with some capital market 
imperfections. The world interest rate is equal to r and constant over time. Individuals 
lend with the world interest rate to the banks while the cost of borrowing is higher than r 
due capital market imperfections. Capital market imperfections are modeled under costly 
state verification framework  [Towsend (1979)] and as limited enforceability of contracts 
with default risk [Eaton, Gersovitz, Stiglitz (1986)]. Costly state verification framework 
assumes that lenders need to incur a monitoring cost to observe the outcome of an 
investment. Unless this monitoring cost is incurred, incentive compatibility constraints do 
not bind and repayment cannot hinge on the outcome. Therefore, incentive compatible 
contracts are implemented when monitoring takes place in only circumstances where the 
borrower is unable to comply with the contracted fixed repayment. When the borrowers 
do not carry out the debt repayment, lenders seize a part the realized outcome by 
incurring monitoring cost to verify the outcome. Hence, one form of capital imperfections 
stems from the costly state verification structure. Other form of capital market 
imperfection depends on the limited enforceability of contracts such that a fraction of 
total outcome can be confiscated when default takes place. These financial market 
imperfections raise the cost of financial intermediation. Hence, the borrowers pay higher 
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than the world interest rate when capital market imperfections in the country are more 
severe than the rest of the world. 
In the model, individuals who do not have enough wealth in the first period to 
invest on the human capital and to obtain the advanced technology may finance their 
investment through banking sector. For the sake of simplicity, all financial markets are 
just represented by the banking sector.  The banks are just assumed to play an 
intermediary role between lenders and borrowers without making excess profit. 
Therefore, banks borrow with the world interest rate r, in international and domestic 
markets and lend to the investors by incorporating the expected state verification and 
default cost. The banks, therefore, charge an interest rate, i, higher than the world interest 
rate r, as long as expected cost associated with financial market imperfections is positive. 
The banking sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive and the banks do not default to 
capture the fact that individuals can lend with interest rate r to the rest of the world 
without any risk. 
Loans are contracted in the first period and repaid in the second period. Since 
individuals live just two periods, we avoid reputation issue of debt repayment in this 
overlapping generations setting. Given the option to default, individual i, pays the 
minimum of contracted debt repayment or a fraction of realized output: 
})1(;min{ 2 i
iS
i IrY D+χ ,  10 ≤≤ χ   (4) 
Where SiY2  is the income of individual i  in period 2 received from investing in the 
advanced technology. iDr  is contractual domestic interest rate and determined by the 
degree of capital market imprecations below and χ  denotes the fraction of individual’s 
realized output that the banks can appropriate in case of default. χ  ,therefore, represents 
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the bank’s bargaining power. iI  is the amount of loan individual i gets from the bank to 
finance fixed investment I, hence, ii eII −= . ie  is the amount of wealth or bequest in the 
first period. Due to the financial market imperfections, borrowing is costly and 
individuals only borrow enough to invest in the fixed human capital and they lend what is 
left over from their investment in financial markets with the world interest rate r. 
Similarly, all the wealth that is not invested in the human capital is lent with the interest 
rate r. 
In case of default, the banks spend real resources η  per unit of currency lent to 
appropriate a fraction of output. This cost is spent for the state verification and 
enforcement of contract. Hence, the banks expect to receive net debt repayment equal to: 
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The threshold levels of idiosyncratic shock associated with default vary in 
recessions and in booms. More default takes place in the recession than in the booms. In 
other words, in the booms, aggregate shock is so good that individuals with bad 
idiosyncratic shocks may find it better not to default. In the recessions, the opposite takes 
place; aggregate negative shock induces more individual to default even though their 
idiosyncratic shocks are not too bad. 
Let us denote the threshold levels of idiosyncratic shock for default in recessions 
and booms as ∗
iR
ε and ∗
iB
ε  respectively. Given (1) and (4), the value of ∗
iR
ε and ∗
iB
ε  for 
individual i can be defined as: 
iD IrIaiR )1()1( +=+− ∗ χεδ
L
 (6) 
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The banking sector is perfectly competitive; hence, there are many banks 
competing for an individual customer. Moreover, individual customer borrows just 
enough to carry out the fixed investment. Therefore, the loans demanded by the 
individuals vary with respect to their initial income. However, the return from investment 
is same ex-ante for all the individuals. The banks therefore, charge different interest rate 
to the individuals according to their level of borrowing. It makes sense to think that the 
expected income in the second period is considered as a collateral that the banks can 
seize a fraction of it. That means that the amount of collateral is same for all the 
individuals investing but the amount of loan varies. When the banks compete for 
individual customer, each bank would reduce the interest rate until the expected cost and 
benefit are equalized. The expected default for individuals with fewer loans is lower than 
the expected default of individuals with more loans given that their expected income in 
the second period is same. The banks then offer lower interest rate to the individuals 
borrowing less. Therefore, the supply of funds is upward sloping in domestic financial 
markets due to capital market imperfections associated with default, partial enforcement 
and state verification costs. 
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The expected return on typical bank’s lending to individual i per unit of loan in 
booms and recessions are: 
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Since the probability of the next period to be boom or recession episode is 1/2, we 
can write the bank’s expected yield for unit of loan as: 
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The first term in (12) indicates that the banks receive )1( iDr+  in case of no 
default. But there is a possibility that the individual i’s idiosyncratic shock falls into the 
default region. The second term indicate the amount of appropriation associated with 
partial debt repayment in case of default. The last term is the monitoring cost incurred to 
verify the output after default. 
The aggregate volatility in this model is characterized as the magnitude of δG . For 
higher values of δG ,  the output of the economy changes more between recessions and 
booms. It can be see from (6) and (7) that for a low enough degree of volatility, no 
default takes place such that even in recessions with the worst idiosyncratic shock, the 
individuals have an incentive to pay fully if: 
i
i
D IrIa )1()~1( +≥−− χεδ
G
 (13-1) 
or 
Ia
Ir i
i
D
χεδ
)1(
)~1(
+−−≤G  (13-2) 
For individuals financing all the fixed investment from banking sector, II i = , the 
condition for no default even in recessions and with the worst idiosyncratic shock is: 
χεδδ a
r iD )1()~1( +−−=≤ ∗G  (13-3) 
If individuals with the highest debt and with the worst idiosyncratic shock do not 
default in recessions, nobody defaults in the economy.  Equation (13-3) states that for 
level of volatility below ∗δ , nobody defaults and hence there is no capital market 
imperfections associated with default.  Consequently, the domestic interest rate is equal 
to the world interest rate: 
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rr iD =  if  χεδδ a
r iD )1()~1( +−−=≤ ∗G   (13-4) 
Equation (13-4) also implies that an increase in r makes the economy more 
vulnerable to the aggregate shocks such that smaller shocks are enough to generate 
capital market imperfections. 
When (13-1) is reversed, the bank’s return in recessions and booms would differ 
because of the default and partial repayment. In this model, we are interested in volatility 
when the financial market imperfections exist. Following proposition shows that the 
interest rate charged by the banks increases when volatility exceeds a certain threshold 
where nobody defaults in the booms. 
Proposition 12: 
Greater volatility of aggregate macroeconomic shocks increases the financial 
imperfections associated with costly state verification and default and in turn increases 
the domestic interest rate charged to individual i by the banks )( iDr when 
χεδδ a
riD )1()~1( ++−−=≥ ∗∗G . 
When volatility changes in the range )( ∗∗∗ ≤≤ δδδ G , greater volatility does not 
lead to higher financial imprecations and higher )( iDr  because the expected loss from 
defaults remain constant. 
The volatility and capital market imperfection follow a nonlinear path. For low 
level of volatility there is no capital market imperfection and the domestic interest rate is 
equal to the world interest rate. For an intermediate degree of volatility, capital market 
                                                 
2 Proofs are delegated to the appendix. 
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imperfections and the resulting domestic interest rate are constant. After a certain 
threshold )( ∗∗δ , greater volatility increases the financial imperfections and the domestic 
interest rate. 
       iDr  
 
          i  
             r  
                      ∗δ        ∗∗δ               δ  
           (Figure 2) 
 
Proposition 2: 
(i)Higher intermediation cost associated with state verification cost increases the 
domestic interest rate 0)1( ≥∂
+∂
η
i
Dr . 
(ii) Greater macroeconomic volatility aggravates the capital market imperfections 
associated with costly intermediationη , 0)1(
2
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ε
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3-Volatility and Growth 
Decision to invest in advanced technology depends on the initial wealth of an 
individual when capital markets are imperfect. When there is no capital market 
imperfection, individuals lend with world interest rate (r) and as long as the expected net 
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outcome from investing in better technology exceeds the expected net outcome from 
inferior technology, everybody invests in human capital. However, in the presence of 
capital market imperfections associated with state verification cost and partial 
enforcement of debt repayment, the equilibrium interest rate in the country exceeds the 
world interest rate. Moreover, individuals differ with respect to their initial endowment 
(bequest from their parents) and therefore need different levels of loan to finance their 
investment on human capital. First, let us consider an individual with initial wealth )( ie  
higher than fixed cost of investment, (I). This individual does not need to borrow from 
the financial markets and incur additional cost for financing the fixed investment, 
)( rr iD − . This individual invests in the advanced technology and lends what is left over 
from his/her investment with interest rate (r). Then, this individual’s expected lifetime 
income at the end of the second period is: 
)1)(()( 2 rIeYEW i
S
i
S
i +−+=   )( Iei ≥  (1) 
Now let us consider an individual with initial wealth less than (I).   This 
individual either does not invest in the advanced technology or borrow in financial 
markets to invest in fixed investment (I). When an individual who inherits an amount of 
)( ie  in the first period of life chooses not to invest in the advanced technology, his/her 
expected lifetime income is: 
{ }NiiNiNi EYreEYW 21 )1)(( +++=    (2) 
An alternative for this individual is to borrow ii IeI =− )(  and to invest in the 
advanced technology. His/her lifetime income is: 
{ }{ }))(1(;min)( 22 iiDSiSiSFi eIrYYEW −+−= χ   (3) 
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by using (1), (3) can be rewritten as: 
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where )(aI  is expected outcome from investing and the second part is the cost of 
financing and the third part is the cost of financing in the case of default. 
It is clear that when Ni
SF
i WW ≥  all the individuals prefer to invest in the advanced 
technology. Ni
SF
i WW ≥  can be rewritten as: 
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Individuals with initial wealth less than )( ∗ie  prefer not to invest in the advanced 
technology. Therefore, capital market imperfections prevent the individuals with income 
less than )( ∗ie  to benefit from better technology due to higher interest rate to the 
borrowers. Therefore, initial distribution of income partially determines whether the 
individuals would benefit from better technology. Countries with more equal income 
distribution suffer less from capital market imperfections and invest more in better 
production technologies and grow faster. 
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Next proposition highlights the effects of volatility on the threshold level of initial 
endowment )( ∗ie . 
 
Proposition 3: 
Greater volatility increases the gap between domestic and international interest rate 
and prevents more people from benefiting from better technology and consequently 
reduces the growth for ∗∗≥ δδG . 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ≥∂
∂ ∗
0δG
ie . 
 
The model suggests that economic volatility is distributed asymmetrically among 
individuals in the society. The rich who have enough wealth to invest in the advanced 
technology (or human capital) are not affected by increasing volatility. However, the poor 
are unable to invest on human capital due to increasing financial imperfections associated 
with greater volatility.  
 
4- Conclusion 
This paper provides a model to account for the empirical evidence that volatility 
reduces growth. In the model, greater volatility increases the cost associated with capital 
market imperfections and induces the financial intermediaries to charge higher interest 
rates. The model is based on one of overlapping generations with two types of 
technologies. The more productive technology requires fixed investment in the first 
period. Individual with income less than the amount of fixed investment may borrow in 
financial markets to obtain more productive technology. Increase in volatility raises the 
cost of borrowing and makes it less attractive to invest in more productive technology for 
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individuals below certain income in the first period. Hence, volatility reduces growth by 
deterring people from taking advantage of more productive technology.   This model also 
explains the empirical findings of Ramey and Ramey (1995) that investment is not the 
channel between volatility and growth by suggesting that totals factor productivity rather 
than the total factor accumulation is the key for growth.  
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: 
This proposition follows from the fact that the banks are risk neutral and make no 
excess profit. Therefore, the expected return in (12) must be equal to a constant )1( r+ . In 
the boom, the condition that even the most indebted individual, )( II i = with the worst 
idiosyncratic shocks does not default: 
i
i
D IrIa )1()~1( +≥−+ χεδ
G
 
equivalently, 
χεδδ a
r iD )1()~1( ++−−=≥ ∗∗G  
For ∗∗≥ δδG , since no default takes place in booms, an increase in aggregate 
volatility only increase the number of individual defaults in recession and the total cost 
associated with defaults. Higher cost then requires the banks to increase )( iDr  such that 
zero profit condition is satisfied. Let us take the derivative of (12) with respect to )(δG  
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since for ∗∗≥ δδG ,   0=∂
∂ ∗
δ
εGiB  and 0)~( =−εF  we can rewrite (P-1) as : 
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(P-2) 
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since ∗∗ ≥≥
ii BR
εεε~ , the second term in (P-2) is 0≤ . The first term in (P-2), 
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Since the first and the second terms are 0≤  then the last term in (P-2) must be 0≥  and 
0)1( ≥∂
+∂
δG
i
Dr . 
Therefore, we can conclude that for a given level of volatility when greater 
volatility )( ∗∗≥ δδG  requires higher domestic interest rate QED. 
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Proof of Proposition 2:  
(i) by differentiating (12) with respect to η , one gets: 
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